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We study how, at times of CEO transitions, the identity of the CEO suc-
cessor shapes labor contracts within family ﬁrms. We propose an alternate
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management in family ﬁrms. The idea developed in this paper is that, in
contrast to external professionals, CEOs promoted from within the family
not only inherit control of the ﬁrm but also inherit a set of implicit con-
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1 Introduction
Recent empirical work has highlighted that inherited control in family ﬁrms is
associated with lower ﬁrm performance, as compared to management by external
professionals (Bennedsen, Nielsen, Perez-Gonzalez and Wolfenzon (2007); Perez-
Gonzalez (2002); Villalonga and Amit (2002)). The underperformance of family-
promoted CEOs with respect to external professionals is typically interpreted
as wasteful nepotism (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006) and a failure of meritoc-
racy(Caselli and Gennaioli, 2003).
The literature attributes the gap in ﬁrm performance to a lack of talented
management in the family. Selecting managers solely among family members
not only limits the pool of potential talent to run the ﬁrm, but it might also
imply a lower quality pool of managers. This may be because family members
might invest less in education because they know they will end up running the
ﬁrm (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007). Alternatively, unless managerial talent is
perfectly correlated across generations, the ﬁrm will ultimately end up in the
wrong hands(Caselli and Gennaioli, 2003).
We propose an alternate view of how family-promoted CEOs might underper-
form compared to external CEOs. We study how, at times of CEO transitions,
the identity of the CEO successor shapes labor contracts within family ﬁrms.
The basic idea developed in this paper is that, in contrast to external profession-
als, CEOs promoted from within the family not only inherit control of the ﬁrm,
but also inherit a set of implicit contracts that aﬀects their ability to restructure
the ﬁrm. Such constraints are likely to be most acute immediately after a CEO
transition takes place.
Why should family-promoted CEOs be bound by their predecessors' promises?
First, because dynastic managers have a longer time horizon (Morck and Yeung,
2003). Second, because family-promoted successors are endowed with preferences
similar to the incumbent CEO's, as argued by Shleifer and Summers (1987):
It is probably most likely that prospective managers are trained/or
brought up to be commited to stakeholders. For example, in a fam-
ily enterprise, oﬀspring could be raised to believe in the company's
paternalism towards all the parties involved in its operation.
Using a unique dataset of French CEO successions together with matched
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employer-employee information, we test whether management practices of family
promoted CEOs are consistent with the persistence of implicit contracts across
generations of family CEOs. We ﬁrst investigate the dynastic commitment hy-
pothesis using a diﬀerences in diﬀerences approach, and we show that the simple
diﬀerences in diﬀerences estimates obtained are robust to a variety of potential
confounding factors. We then take into account the potential endogeneity of the
transition decision by instrumenting for dynastic preferences.
Contrary to Perez-Gonzalez (2005), we ﬁnd that external CEOs are associ-
ated with a higher turnover of the workforce, as compared to family-promoted
CEOs. However, consistent with our dynastic commitment hypothesis, the higher
turnover in non-dynastic ﬁrms is also associated with greater wage renegotiation
for both the incumbent and the arriving workforce. Indeed, since the ﬁrm oﬀers
a joint product relative to employment and ﬁnancial intermediation, it will need
to compensate workers for the greater termination risk faced after renegotiation
by external CEOs (Bailly, 1974). Finally, we show that family management is
also associated with greater loyalty towards the incumbent workforce: family pro-
moted CEOs rely more on internal promotion of the management workforce and
less on the hiring of external managers.
This paper contributes to the literature on the performance of heir-managed
ﬁrms. We highlight an alternate view of how dynastic transitions might under-
perform non-dynastic ones. Contrary to Perez-Gonzalez (2005), Bennedsen et
al.(2007) and Caselli and Gennaioli (2003), we show that commitment rather
than talent might have an impact on family ﬁrm performance following a CEO
transition. Our paper also contributes to the emerging literature on the distinct
features of family management. Our results are consistent with the argument of
Sraer and Thesmar (2007) that heir-managed ﬁrms are more credible in build-
ing long-term relationships with their workforce, in particular by means of less
turnover in exchange for lower wages. In the same line of argument, Mueller and
Philippon (2008) ﬁnd that dynastic ﬁrms are more numerous where labor rela-
tions are more conﬂictual, thus giving weight to the idea that those ﬁrms have
some natural long-term credibility vis-à-vis the workforce.
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2 Implicit Contracts With the Family
The idea that implicit contracts pervade between shareholders and stakeholders
within the ﬁrm is well known (Shleifer and Summers, 1988; Kreps, 1990). Im-
plicit contracts can serve to promote relationship-speciﬁc capital investment by
stakeholders (Williamson, 1985), as an eﬀort elicitation device (Lazear, 1979)
or as a a risk sharing device (Harris and Holmstrom, 1982; Guiso et al., 2005).
Generally, the ability to use such contracts depends on the stakeholders' ability
to credibly commit to no ex-post renegotiation.
The identity of the CEO is likely to play an important role in whether or not
implicit contracts are upheld (Shleifer and Summers, 1988; Akerlof, 1983). This
is particularly true during times of CEO transitions in family ﬁrms, as the family
has the choice between promoting a family member or an external manager to
the position of CEO. The basic idea developed in this paper is that, in contrast
to external professionals, CEOs promoted from within the family are committed
to upholding contracts signed under the previous family management.
Why should family-promoted CEOs be bound by their predecessors' promises?
First, because dynastic managers have a longer time horizon. Morck and Yeung
(2003) for instance argue that professional CEO's careers are relatively brief. In
contrast, family control endures, with patriarchs grooming scions, sometimes for
decades. Second, because family-promoted successors are endowed with prefer-
ences similar to the incumbents CEO's. An example is given by Bertrand and
Schoar (2003):
In an interview withWharton Alumni Magazine (Moﬃtt, 2000), Brian
L. Roberts, current CEO of Comcast and son of Ralph J. Roberts, the
founder of Comcast, reports going to work with his father as a teen
and "learning the nuts and bolts of the cable business." His father
had "his teenage son sit in on some of the signiﬁcant deals in the
making, positioning Brian at the back of the room and instructing
him to quietly listen."
Finally, the idea that family promoted CEOs also inherit a set of contracts is
consistent with evidence on persisting welfare paternalism in Europe and the US
(Sraer and Thesmar, 2004; Mueller and Phillipon, 2009).
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However, such long-term contracts may also entail signiﬁcant opportunity
costs for the family promoted CEO. They deprive family management of the pos-
sibility of restructuring the ﬁrm according to changing economic environments
(Shleifer and Summers, 1988). External CEOs, on the other hand, are less likely
to be constrained by the previous management's promises. This leads to our ﬁrst
prediction:
Prediction 1: The transition from family management to external management
will be associated with higher workforce turnover. The higher turnover will mainly
aﬀect long-tenured employees.
Breaking implicit contracts also entails costs for the external CEO. As argued
by Bailly (1974), the ﬁrm oﬀers a joint product relative to employment and ﬁ-
nancial intermediation. Consequently, the ﬁrm will have to compensate workers
for the greater termination risk faced. This leads to our second prediction:
Prediction 2: The transition from family management to external management
will be associated with an increase in wages for both the incumbent workforce and
the newly hired workforce.
Family-promoted management, on the other hand, will be associated with a
greater reliance on the internal workforce as opposed to external hirings. This
is the case when family ﬁrms enjoy private beneﬁts associated with employment
relationships (Lippi and Schivardi, 2009).
Prediction 3: Family-promoted management will rely more on the internal pro-
motion of the workforce and less on external hirings.
Our analysis focuses on higher layers of the ﬁrm. Managers are by deﬁnition
the primary implementers of a CEO's vision (for a theoretical discussion of the
relationship between CEOs and managers, see Landier et al. (2009)). Managers
are therefore most likely to make ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments and are therefore those
employees for which a change at the very top has potentially the biggest conse-
quences (Bhagat et al., 1990).
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3 Data Description
3.1 Data Sources and Variables
Our empirical analysis combines a unique dataset on French CEO transitions
and matched employer-employee datasets for the period from 1997 to 2002. As
in Bach (2008), we identify CEO transitions on the basis of CEO names available
in the DIANE dataset. For the period under study, we compare monthly issues of
DIANE in order to track the timing and the dynastic character of a succession.
DIANE covers 90% of French ﬁrms with more than 100 employees and 76%
of ﬁrms with 20 to 49 employees. Unfortunately, the data do not allow us to
distinguish between professional managers and sons-in-law.1 Focusing on ﬁrms
which experienced a single CEO succession between 1997 and 2002, we obtain a
dataset of more than 20,000 observed successions, 20% of which could be identiﬁed
as dynastic transitions.
Firm characteristics are extracted from ﬁrm balance sheets compiled by the
French National Institute of Statistics. The accounting information available cov-
ers all French ﬁrms, regardless of ownership, whose annual sales exceed 100,000
Euros in the service sector and 200,000 Euros in other sectors. Above these
thresholds, ﬁrms are required to ﬁll out a detailed balance sheet and proﬁt state-
ment. Instead, smaller ﬁrms are subject to a simpliﬁed tax regime. The tax ﬁles
also include four-digit industry classiﬁcation codes similar to the US SIC coding
system and unique ﬁrm identiﬁers that allow us to track ﬁrms over time.
Finally, we construct variables on the workforce of a ﬁrm based on employee
tax ﬁles also collected by the French National Institute of Statistics. This dataset
consists of mandatory employer reports of the gross earnings of each employee
subject to French payroll taxes, and is similar to the one used by Abowd, Kramarz
and Margolis (1999). It essentially covers all employed persons in the economy
and provides information about an individual's age, gender, occupation, total
net nominal earnings during the year, and hours worked. In addition, it contains
information about whether or not the individual began or left his employment at
1For an in-depth discussion of the data and the problem posed by sons-in-law, refer to Bach
(2008).
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the plant during the year. We aggregate data at the ﬁrm level so as to construct
measures of management turnover, management promotions, wage raises, and
skill and age composition.
We delete as outliers ﬁrm succession observations whose average OROA dur-
ing the two years prior to the transition fall outside a multiple of ﬁve of the
interquartile range. We also delete as outliers ﬁrm succession observations in
terms of layoﬀ, arrival, and wage raise ratios using the same procedure.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on ﬁrm balance sheet characteristics. On
average, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms experiencing dynastic successions are signiﬁcantly
smaller, both in terms of employment and sales, than ﬁrms experiencing transi-
tions to external professionals. Dynastic successions occur in ﬁrms with a work-
force half the size of non-dynastic ones, on average. This is in line with previous
ﬁndings by Bennedsen et al. (2007) that indicate that dynastic ﬁrms in Denmark
are four times smaller in terms of assets than non-dynastic ones.
Family ﬁrms experiencing a dynastic transition also do signiﬁcantly better in
terms of proﬁtability. The average proﬁtability of dynastic ﬁrms during the two
years preceding the transition is 1.3 percentage points higher than the average
proﬁtability of non-dynastic ﬁrms. Such evidence is consistent with several ex-
planations. It might hint at the endogeneity of the timing of the transmission
decision (Bennedsen et al., 2007) or possibly at the existence of signiﬁcant founder
eﬀects (Adams, Almeida and Ferreira, 2003). Finally, it could also be consistent
with the more prudent growth path of family ﬁrms (Morck et al., 2000), since
dynastic ﬁrms are also on average signiﬁcantly older and less indebted than non-
dynastic ones. In the presence of decreasing returns to scale, such behavior could
lead to higher apparent proﬁtability.
Panels A and B in table 2 provide descriptive evidence on the organizational
structure of ﬁrms. Consistent with previous evidence on family ﬁrms by Sraer
and Thesmar (2007), we ﬁnd that dynastic ﬁrms employ a lower fraction of man-
agers with respect to the total size of the workforce. Diﬀerences in organizational
structures are particularly strong when comparing the relative share of high man-
agers in the ﬁrm, which is twice as high in non-dynastic ﬁrms. This is consistent
7
either with dynastic ﬁrms being relatively more labor intensive or with a clus-
tering of these ﬁrms in labor intensive activities. Mueller and Philippon (2008)
ﬁnd, in cross-country data, that family ﬁrms have more weight in labor intensive
industries, especially when overall labor relations are poor enough, which is the
case of France according to their study. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that the manage-
rial workforce in dynastic ﬁrms is also older on average than that of non-dynastic
ﬁrms.
Table 3 provides descriptive evidence on tenure patterns of the workforce. To
compute tenure we have to use a random extract of our initial data consisting of
employees who were born in October of even-numbered years. As this consider-
ably reduces the size of our sample, we will use the resulting subsample only to
provide complementary evidence. We ﬁnd that the workforce in dynastic ﬁrms
has, on average, one more year of tenure as compared to non-dynastic ﬁrms. In-
terestingly, the diﬀerence is greatest for the high management category. This is
consistent with our idea that dynastic ﬁrms have more credibility in long-term
relationships, and that such credibility is most valuable for higher management
categories.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Conceptual Issues
The main conceptual and empirical challenge is that neither ﬁrms experiencing
dynastic transitions, nor ﬁrms experiencing transitions to external profession-
als can be considered random draws. Shareholders decide on the nature of the
CEO transition precisely by anticipating gains and losses from maintaining or
not implicit contracts with stakeholders.
Thus, dynastic successions are in many ways brought about by the prospects
of the ﬁrms, even though we do not know a priori the sign of that causation
(Bennedsen et al., 2007). One aspect of the endogeneity bias is more speciﬁc to
restructuring itself: if restructuring has to be undertaken, the incumbent owner
may choose to leave his son in control because he will have more legitimacy in
employees' minds. On the other hand, the incumbent family may not want to
involve itself in painful restructuring and therefore leaves the ﬁrm in the hands
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of an external manager. Again, the sign of the endogeneity bias is not obvious.
To tackle these endogeneity problems we must ﬁrst adopt a diﬀerences in
diﬀerences strategy. We compare the average intensity of a ﬁrm's restructuring
activity during the two years following a transition, with the average intensity of
a ﬁrm's restructuring activity during the two years preceding a transition. Pro-
vided time diﬀerences in the outcome are identical across ﬁrms in the absence of
treatment, the diﬀerence between dynastic and external transitions will indicate
how committment to existing contracts aﬀects ﬁrm restructuring (Angrist and
Pischke, 2008). The identiﬁcation strategy therefore requires that any structural
trend in the outcome not evolve over time for reasons other than the succession.
It is important that the trend be of the same magnitude for both groups of ﬁrms,
especially before the transition.
4.2 Graphical Analysis
Figure 1 provides an initial insight into the main tradeoﬀ analysed. It plots
layoﬀ rates (left-hand side) and wage raises (right-hand side) for the management
workforce of dynastic and non-dynastic ﬁrms for each of the two years before and
after the control transition.2
Firms where dynastic successions occur structurally diﬀer with respect to
ﬁrms experiencing non-dynastic transitions. Both layoﬀ rates and wage raises
are signiﬁcantly lower before control transitions for dynastic ﬁrms than for non-
dynastic ones. Layoﬀ rates in dynastic ﬁrms are about 3 percentage points lower
than layoﬀ rates in non-dynastic ﬁrms in both years prior to the transition. The
diﬀerence in layoﬀ rates is highest for the high management category (4 percent-
age points) as compared to middle management (2 percentage points). A similar
pattern applies to the diﬀerences in wage raises of the management workforce in
both types of ﬁrms.
Note as well the existence of a structural increasing trend in layoﬀ rates and
wage raises around the time of succession. Our identiﬁcation strategy, however,
only requires the increasing trend to be of the same magnitude for both groups
of ﬁrms before the transition. Figure 1 seems to conﬁrm this hypothesis since
the trajectories for both groups are parallel before a succession occurs. Another
test is to check whether or not the trajectories diverge after a succession occurs.
2Excluding the transition year itself.
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However, since the eﬀect of a succession may develop over more than one year, it
is possible that these trajectories do diverge after a succession. In nearly all the
ﬁgures we see no divergence in the trajectories of layoﬀ rates between the two
groups. Only in the case of average wage raises after the transition do we observe
a divergent slope for the dynastic ﬁrms. However, the wage raise slopes of the
subcategories are parallel for both groups.
Thus, diﬀerences in the structural diﬀerence between the two groups that arise
after the succession can reasonably be interpreted as caused by the succession.3
Diﬀerences in average layoﬀ rates jump from 3 percentage points before the tran-
sition to over 5 percentage points after the transition. We interpret these ﬁgures
as indicative that family successions do reduce layoﬀ rates following a change of
CEO by about 2 percentage points. The constant diﬀerence following the succes-
sion suggests that the change in layoﬀ behavior occurs right after the succession
and is persistent (up to two years after the succession). These diﬀerences also
appear across management categories. Average wage raises of the management
workforce also display a jump after the control transition. The diﬀerence between
the two groups increases from 1.5 percentage points to over 2.5 percentage points
for the high management category. Except for the overall average wage raise,
diﬀerences in slopes are constant for both high and middle management.
Thus, graphical analysis of diﬀerences in diﬀerences seems to support our
central hypothesis: when a family member replaces the incumbent CEO, the
management workforce suﬀers less from layoﬀs, but at the expense of a less dy-
namic wage proﬁle. These results suggest that family-promoted CEOs not only
inherit control of the ﬁrm, but also inherit a set of implicit contracts that aﬀects
the scope of ﬁrm restructuring.
4.3 Multivariate Analysis
Speciﬁcation
We now turn to multivariate evidence on the impact of dynastic transitions in
terms of a ﬁrm's organizational structure. We estimate the following model by
3Note that this interpretation also relies on the assumption that successions have a rapid
eﬀect on layoﬀs. If this were not the case, then the change in layoﬀ trajectories happening just
one year after the succession would be a sign that the two groups can be diﬀerentially impacted
through channels other than succession.
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OLS:
[
Y
t+2
t+1 − Y t−2t−1
]
i
= αDynastici + βXit−1 + it (1)
where we compare the average intensity of a ﬁrm's restructuring activity dur-
ing the two years following a transition, Y
t+2
t+1, with the average intensity of a
ﬁrm's restructuring activity during the two years preceding a transition Y
t−2
t−1.
Dynastici is a binary indicator of whether or not the transition was dynastic,
and Xit−1 are controls measured one year prior to the succession.
All speciﬁcations include controls for the size and age of the ﬁrm, industry,
business groups, and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Analysis of the data reveals that there is
a high degree of mean reversion in the level of restructuring: ﬁrms that undergo
few episodes of restructuring before the succession are more likely to have greater
restructuring after the succession. This is why we control in our regressions for
the level of restructuring pre-succession. All speciﬁcations are estimated using
heteroskedasticity robust estimation techniques.
Prediction 1: Turnover Rates
Table 4 presents results related to layoﬀ rates of the overall management, as
well as the speciﬁc results for the high management and middle management
categories. Provided external CEOs are less constrained by contracts signed
under the previous family management, they should be more likely to engage in
restructuring the ﬁrm. Consequently, the intensity of workforce turnover should
be higher under non-dynastic transitions as compared to dynastic ones.
Table 4 conﬁrms visual inspection of the diﬀerences in diﬀerences plots. The
estimate for the constant, 0.15, means that the eﬀect of a transition per se is to
increase conditional layoﬀ rates by about 15 percentage points. However, as con-
ﬁrmed by graphical inspection, layoﬀ rates increase less in the case of dynastic
transitions. Column (1) indicates that transitions from one family member to
another decrease layoﬀ rates of management by 3.4 percentage points on average
compared to transitions to external professionals. Columns (2) and (3) suggest
that the less volatile employment relationship related to dynastic transitions ex-
tends to the diﬀerent managerial levels in the ﬁrm.
Note however that graphical analysis suggests a lower layoﬀ rate of around 2
percentage points, as compared to 3.4 percentage points in our multivariate anal-
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ysis. This diﬀerence may not be statistically signiﬁcant. Yet, if it were signiﬁcant,
it would point to the existence of confounding factors driving the diﬀerence in
evolution of the two groups towards zero, thus leading to an underestimation of
the eﬀect of family successions.
Finally, column (4) presents complementary evidence on the evolution of
tenure patterns in family ﬁrms experiencing a CEO transition. Since beneﬁts
from reneging on implicit contracts should be greatest when contracts are back-
loaded (Guiso et al., 2005; Guiso et al., 2009), higher layoﬀ rates should mainly
aﬀect long-tenured workers. We ﬁnd evidence that the higher layoﬀ rates in non-
dynastic transitions concern mainly the more tenured workforce of the ﬁrm. The
average tenure of the overall workforce increases by .2 years in dynastic ﬁrms as
compared to non-dynastic ones.4
Prediction 2: Wage Dynamics
Our argument is that the main diﬀerence in management styles lies in the greater
commitment to existing implicit contracts of family-promoted CEOs. Given that
the ﬁrm oﬀers a joint product relative to employment and ﬁnancial intermedia-
tion, it will need to compensate workers for the greater termination risk faced after
a non-dynastic transition (Bailly, 1974). If this is the case, the higher turnover
in non-dynastic ﬁrms should also be associated with greater wage renegotiation.
Table 5 investigates wage raise patterns of the incumbent workforce. Control
transitions are associated with a signiﬁcant increase of wage raises in the order of
7.2 percentage points. However, this increase in wages is less pronounced in the
case of dynastic transitions. Dynastic transitions reduce wages raises associated
with control transitions by 1.9 percentage points. This diﬀerence is highest for the
high management category where dynastic transitions lower wage raises by 2.1
percentage points. These diﬀerences are statisically signiﬁcant and valid across
management categories.
Table 6, on the other hand, investigates how wages of the newly hired work-
force evolve at times of control transitions. Contrary to the incumbent workforce,
which is locked into existing contracts, wages of the newly hired workforce should
more directly reﬂect the reputation costs associated with reneging on past implicit
4One would like to cast this test in its ideal setting: only testing for the tenure of the laid-
oﬀ workforce. However, the sample shrinks considerably and we therefore prefer to present
evidence on average tenure patterns.
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contracts. This is conﬁrmed by column (1) of table 6, since ﬁrms experiencing
a non-dynastic transitions have to pay, on average, a 3.5% premium on wages
to newly hired managers. These diﬀerences are in all cases greater than the
diﬀerences in wage raises of the incumbent workforce.
Such a pattern could, however, also be consistent with external CEOs hiring
more competent or less risk averse managers (Bandiera et al., 2009). Although
this would explain the diﬀerences in wages of arriving managers, it is not neces-
sarily compatible with an increase in wages for the incumbent workforce. Taken
together, our results therefore point to diﬀerences in management styles consis-
tent with our commitment hypothesis.
Prediction 3: Hiring and Promotions Rates
We will now investigate whether implicit contracts with the dynasty might extend
to other dimensions of the ﬁrm's management and organization. Table 7 analyses
whether family promoted CEOs rely more on the incumbent management work-
force compared to external CEOs. This is the case, for instance, if family ﬁrms
enjoy private beneﬁts from an employment relationship. We therefore expect
family promoted CEOs to rely more on internal promotion of the management
workforce and less on the hiring of external managers.
Left columns (1) and (2) of table 7 show promotions of high management
categories into executive positions and promotions from middle management cat-
egories into high management categories. Results indicate that control transitions
are associated with an increase in the promotion rate of both management cate-
gories into higher positions. However, the impact of dynastic management diﬀers
according to the considered management category. In the case of dynastic tran-
sitions, high management is promoted at a faster rate into executives positions.
Family-promoted CEOs have no statistically signiﬁcant impact on the promotion
rate of the middle management categories.
Columns (1) to (3) on the right-hand side of table 7 show change in man-
agement hirings at the time of a control transition. Results suggest that family
promoted CEO's rely less on the hiring of external management. CEO transi-
tions are associated with an increase in the hirings rate of new managers by 15.6
percentage points. However, family promoted CEOs reduce, ceteris paribus, the
rate at which the ﬁrm hires external management by 3.2 percentage points. This
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impact is statistically signiﬁcant and constant across management categories.
However, one must highlight that, unlike our previous measures of ﬁrm manage-
ment and organization, information on the hiring of new management is likely to
be a relatively noisy measure.5
5 Robustness Checks
5.1 Confounding Factors
Our results suggest that family promoted CEOs are constrained by the promises
of the previous management when restructuring the ﬁrm. However, other deter-
minants could potentially account for diﬀerences between the two types of CEO
successions. In this section we run a horse race between potential confounding
factors and the dynastic commitment hypothesis.
Age and Skill Structure of the Firm
An invalidation of our dynastic commitment hypothesis could result from the
inﬂuence of the age and skill structure of ﬁrms. Descriptive evidence suggests
that the management workforce within dynastic ﬁrms is on average older than
the management workforce in non-dynastic ﬁrms. The age structure at the same
time partly creates via legal obligations, the possibility for newly arrived CEOs
to restructure the ﬁrm.6 In addition, baseline diﬀerences in the skill structure of
the dynastic ﬁrms could impact the scope of internal restructuring.
Table 8 controls for such potential confounding factors. Consistent with age-
related labor law restrictions, we ﬁnd that the average age of the management
workforce negatively impacts both layoﬀs and hirings at times of CEO transi-
tions. Although dynastic transition ﬁrms have a signiﬁcantly, older workforce as
compared to non-dynastic ones , the results are unchanged. Neither the magni-
tude nor the precision of previous estimates changes signiﬁcantly, and therefore
5The main problem of the matched employer-employee dataset is that it is computed at the
plant level. Consequently, a potentially non-negligible fraction of new managers could in fact
be simple transfers from one plant to another. Layoﬀs, wage raises and promotion measures
are however largely unaﬀected by this problem.
6During the analysed period the Contribution Delalande, for instance, penalized ﬁrms who
laid oﬀ workers over the age of 50.
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our primary hypothesis is reinforced.
Firm Proﬁtability
Having shown that our results are robust to the inclusion of workforce speciﬁc
characteristics we now turn to the timing of successions. As shown in Bennedsen
et al. (2007), and conﬁrmed in our descriptive evidence, dynastic transitions
usually occur in good economic environments. This naturally implies that the
need for hard restructuring of the workforce is rather limited. The negative
relation between dynastic successions and management turnover rates would thus
be primarily driven by the performance of the ﬁrm prior to the transition.
Table 9 controls for operating return on assets prior to the transition. As ex-
pected, a higher pre-transition proﬁtability lowers layoﬀ rates after the transition
and increases the hiring of external managers. Our results on the dynastic nature
of the transition are however robust to the inclusion of this proﬁtability measure.
Although OROA before transition is only an imperfect proxy for a ﬁrm's eco-
nomic prospects, we nevertheless believe that it reinforces our point on the link
between commitment to implicit contracts and the scope of ﬁrm restructuring.
5.2 Instrumental Variables
Conceptual Issues
Dynastic successions might still be correlated with the intensity of internal re-
structuring in several ways. Indeed, the identity of the successor may depend
on the ﬁrm's prospects at the time of succession. If control is likely to be relin-
quished to external investors when prospects are good and restructuring needs
are lower, then there would be a spurrious positive correlation between family
successions and restructuring. If, on the other hand, control is more likely to be
relinquished to external investors when prospects are bad, a spurrious negative
correlation would then arise. To the extent that such prospects vary with time
across groups, our diﬀerences in diﬀerences approach might fail to account for
these phenomena.
We therefore propose a new instrument: we observe in the data that certain
characteristics of the name of the ﬁrm prior to succession are very correlated with
the identity of the successor. In particular, those ﬁrms whose name is shared with
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that of the incumbent owner have twice as many chances of undergoing a dynastic
succession. We will call these ﬁrms eponymous ﬁrms. Our explanation for this
strong pattern is that the name conveys information about the dynastic intentions
of the current owner: indeed, Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003) argue that
one of the main amenity potentials linked to keeping a ﬁrm within one's family
is to have one's own name associated with a company's activities.
In our view, this instrument probably has the same advantages and disadvan-
tages as the variable used by Bennedsen et al. (2007): it is decided far in advance
of the succession and is therefore certainly uncorrelated with the prospects of the
ﬁrm when the incumbent owner reaches retirement age. However, it is a static
instrument in the sense that it does not change over time and therefore cannot
both predict the identity of a successor and guarantee that the timing of the suc-
cession is random. It thus remains to control for variables prior to the succession
that could predict the need for restructuring after the succession.
Estimation
We thus take into account the potential endogeneity of the succession decision
by using epynomous ﬁrms to instrument for dynastic intentions. We require the
name of the ﬁrm to inﬂuence restructuring decisions of the ﬁrm only through
its impact on the identity of the successor. Our argument is that the exclu-
sion restriction holds when conditioning on both observable and time constant
unobservable characteristics.
We consequently estimate by Two Stage Least Squares the following system:
Dynastici = φEponymousi + βXit−1 + νit
[
Y
t+2
t+1 − Y t−2t−1
]
i
= αDynastici + βXit−1 + it
(2)
where Eponymousi is a binary indicator of whether or not a ﬁrm shares the same
name as the incumbent CEO. Under the usual IV-LATE assumptions, we thus
obtain the average causal impact of dynastic transitions on the subset of compli-
ers.
Results
In table 10 we instrument the probability of observing a dynastic transition by
a dummy variable equal to 1 when the ﬁrm shares the same name as the in-
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cumbent manager three years before the succession. Columns (1) to (4) present
results of the two stage least squares strategy on the diﬀerent measures of ﬁrm
restructuring. All results are presented with respect to their impact on the overall
management but extend to the diﬀerent subcategories.
First stage estimates suggest that eponymity between the incumbent CEO and
the name of the ﬁrm signiﬁcantly increases the likelihood of a dynastic transition.
The odds increase by 22 percentage points and are highly signiﬁcant (t-statistic
of 23). We therefore have a strong instrument to ex ante predict the dynastic
character of a succession.
The magnitude of all the second stage estimates doubles with respect to OLS
estimates. In column (1), the average reduction in layoﬀ rates associated with
dynastic transitions increases from 3.4 percentage points to over 7 percentage
points, the diﬀerence being statistically signiﬁcant. In column (2), the magni-
tude of the coeﬃcient on dynastic transitions on wage raises of the incumbent
workforce increases threefold. On average, dynastic transitions reduce increases
in wage raises of managers by nearly 6 percentage points. The diﬀerence with
respect to the non-instrumented coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant. It suggests
that nearly all the increase in wage raises associated with a control transition dis-
appear in the case of dynastic transitions. Finally columns (3) and (4), suggest
again that diﬀerences in management style are more pronounced when instru-
menting the dynastic nature of the succession. Again, dynastic transitions rely
more on the internal promotion of the workforce and less on the hiring of external
managers.
The signiﬁcant diﬀerence between OLS and IV estimates suggests that dynas-
tic transitions tend to be more frequent when future layoﬀs are likely, as suggested
by our third prediction. As discussed previously this could be caused by the fact
that ﬁrm restructuring requires some legitimacy on the side of the owners, and
the family tradition provides with legitimacy. All the evidence therefore suggests
that the bias leads to an underestimation of the commitment eﬀect of family-
promoted management.
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6 Conclusion
Why is inherited control of family ﬁrms' associated with lower ﬁrm performance,
as compared to management by external professionals? One explanation is that
family-promoted CEOs are less talented as compared to external CEOs (Perez-
Gonzalez, 2007; Caselli and Gennaioli, 2003). They are selected from a smaller
pool of applicants which is, on average, of lower quality (Bloom and Van Reenen,
2007).
Rather than focusing on the evolution of ﬁrm proﬁtability at times of CEO
transitions, this paper focuses on the evolution of labor contracts at times of
CEO transitions. The basic idea developed in this paper is that, in contrast to
external professionals, CEOs promoted from within the family not only inherit
control of the ﬁrm, but also inherit a set of implicit contracts that aﬀects their
freedom to restructure the ﬁrm. Using a unique matched employer-employee
dataset on CEO transitions in family ﬁrms, we ﬁnd that family-promoted CEOs
are associated with lower turnover of the workforce, lower wage renegotiation, and
greater loyalty to the incumbent workforce. We address causality in a diﬀerences
in diﬀerences setting well-suited to our analysis. We check robustness of our
diﬀerences in diﬀerences estimates ﬁrst by controlling for potentially confounding
factors, and then by instrumenting for dynastic preferences.
We thus highlight an alternate view of how dynastic transitions might un-
derperform relative to non-dynastic ones. The dynastic commitment hypoth-
esis raises questions about the accepted explanation of the lack of talent of
family-promoted CEOs, but does not exclude it. Indeeed, more talented family
CEOs might be better able to resist the constraints imposed by previous family-
management and to restructure the ﬁrm as needed. Therefore, the interaction
between commitment constraints and CEO talent would be of direct interest to
further improve our understanding about family ﬁrms and family management.
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7 Appendix A: Variable Description
Management has been identiﬁed alternatively on the basis of the Catégories So-
cioprofessionnelles classiﬁcation and on the basis of the wage earning distribution
within the ﬁrm:
• All Mgmt: Employees with CSP categorization below 50;
• High Mgmt: Employees with CSP categorization below 40;
• Middle Mgmt: Employees with CSP categorization below 50 but above 40;
• All Empl.: All Employees regardless of CSP categorization;
• Top 5 Mgmt: Employees with CSP categorization above 50 and having one
of the ﬁve highest weekly wages within the ﬁrm;
• Top 10 Mgmt: Employees with CSP categorization above 50 and having
one of the ten highest weekly wages within the ﬁrm;
The dependent variable is the change in the considered outcome computed as
the diﬀerence between the average two-year post-succession minus the two-year
average pre-succession:
• Layoﬀ Rates: Total number of layoﬀs in the considered management cate-
gory divided by total management workforce in the same category;
• Layoﬀ: Employee that left the ﬁrm during the year and that was employed
by this ﬁrm at the beginning of the year;
• Tenure: (Average) Diﬀerence between the year of observation and the start-
ing year of employment;
• Wage Raise: (Average) Diﬀerence between the weekly wage during the year
of observation and the previous year divided by previous year's weekly wage;
• Promotion Rates: Total number of promotions in the considered manage-
ment category divided by total management workforce in the same category;
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• Promotions: In the case of CSP classiﬁcation, this refers to an employee
with a positive change in management classiﬁcation between the current
and the previous year of observation. In the case of the wage distribution
classiﬁcation this refers to an employee who entered the Top 5 or Top 10
ranking during the year of observation and who was employed by the ﬁrm
the previous year;
• Hiring Rates: Total number of hirings in the considered management cat-
egory divided by total management workforce in the same category;
• Hiring: Employee of the ﬁrm in a given year that did not receive a wage
from this ﬁrm the previous year.
The following ﬁrm characteristics have been measured alternatively one year be-
fore the transition (multivariate analysis) or as two year averages before the CEO
transition (descriptive statistics):
• Dynastic Transition: Binary indicator of whether the new CEO shares the
same name as the departing CEO;
• Age of Firm: Administrative age of the ﬁrm as indicated in the BRN tax
ﬁles;
• Log of Sales: natural logarithm of total sales;
• Log of Total Employment: natural logarithm of total workforce;
• Pre-Transition Levels: level of the outcome variable before the CEO tran-
sition;
8 Appendix B: Tables and Figures
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Table 1: FIRM CHARACTERISTICS BY CEO SUCCESSION
Type of Succession
All Dynastic Unrelated Diﬀerence
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Sales 36.6 16.3 41.7 -25.4***
(2.5) (2.1) (3.1) (6.3)
[15160] [3027] [12133]
Total Employment 179 99 199 -100*
(22) (12.2) (27.2) (54.8)
[15160] [3027] [12133]
Age of Firm 20.8 23.5 20 3.5***
(.1) (.22) (.12) (.26)
[14239] [2908] [11331]
Operating Returns on Assets .24 .253 .237 .016**
(.003) (.006) (.004) (.008)
[15160] [3027] [12133]
Debt to Assets Ratio .53 .4 .57 -.17**
(.03) (.01) (.03) (.01)
[15118] [3024] [12094]
Note: The table reports average ﬁrm characteristics over the two years preceding the CEO transition.
CEO successions are classiﬁed into two groups: Dynastic, when the new CEO shares the same name with
the departing CEO, Unrelated otherwise. Sales is deﬁned as total sales of the ﬁrm in milions of Euros.
Total Employment is deﬁned as total employment of the ﬁrm. Age is deﬁned as the administrative
age of the ﬁrm as indicated in BRN tax ﬁles. Operating Return on Assets is computed as the ratio of
operating proﬁts to total assets. Debt to Assets Ratio is computed as the ratio of total debt to total
assets. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis and the number of observations in square brackets.
***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 2: MANAGEMENT CHARACTERISTICS BY CEO SUCCESSION
Type of Succession
All Dynastic Unrelated Diﬀerence
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Workforce Skill Composition
Management to Workforce Ratio (All) .32 .2 .35 -.15***
(.00) (.01) (.00) (0.01)
[14659] [2794] [11850]
Management to Workforce Ratio (High) .21 .1 .23 -.12***
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.01)
[14659] [2794] [11850]
Management to Workforce Ratio (Middle) .09 .07 .1 -.03***
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
[14659] [2794] [11850]
B. Workforce Age Composition
Age of Management Workforce (All) 43.9 44.9 43.7 1.2***
(.05) (.12) (.05) (.12)
[14661] [2795] [11866]
Age of Management Workforce (High) 42.3 42.7 42.3 .4**
(.06) (.15) (.06) (.15)
[14661] [2795] [11866]
Age of Management Workforce (Middle) 42.13 42.8 42 .8***
(.07) (.17) (.07) (.18)
[14661] [2795] [11866]
Note: The table reports the average management characteristics of the ﬁrm over the two years preceding the CEO
transition. CEO successions are classiﬁed into two groups: Dynastic, when the new CEO shares the same name
with the departing CEO, Unrelated otherwise. Management to Workforce Ratio is computed as the ratio of the total
management workforce to total employment of the ﬁrm where total management workforce is identiﬁed according to
the Catégories Socioprofessionnelles classiﬁcation used by INSEE. Age of Management Workforce is computed as the
average age of the management workforce. All deﬁnes management workforce as employees with CSP categorization
below 50. Middle measures middle management workforce as employees with CSP categorization below 50 but above
40. High measures high management workforce as employees with CSP categorization below 40. Standard errors are
reported in parenthesis and the number of observations in square brackets. ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5
and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 3: TENURE OF WORKFORCE BY CEO TRANSITION
Type of Succession
All Family Unrelated Diﬀerence
Workforce Tenure (1) (2) (3) (4)
All Empl. 6.23 7 6 -1***
(.04) (.11) (.05) (.11)
[13151] [2541] [10610]
High Management 6.36 8.25 6.1 -2.14***
(.12) (.41) (.12) (.37)
[2529] [309] [2220]
Middle Management 6.16 6.75 6.01 -.74***
(.04) (.11) (.04) (.11)
[12003] [2400] [9603]
Workers 6.23 7 6.05 -.95***
(.04) (.11) (.05) (.11)
[13151] [2541] [10610]
Note: The table reports the average tenure of the total workforce of the ﬁrm. The table uses
an extract of employees covering all individuals employed in French enterprises who were born
in October of even-numbered years. This considerably reduces the size of our sample but allows
us to compute Tenure as the diﬀerence between a given year of employment and the starting
year of employment. All Empl. refers to all employees of the ﬁrm irrespective of their CSP
classiﬁcation. Workers refers to all employess with CSP categorization above 50. See appendix
for the deﬁnition of the remaining variables. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis and
the number of observations in square brackets. ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10
percent levels, respectively.
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Table 5: WAGE RAISE PATTERNS OF INCUMBENT WORKFORCE
Dependent Variable: Changes in Wage of Firm Raise Patterns
All Mgmt High Mgmt Middle Mgmt
(1) (2) (3)
Dynastic Transition -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.012***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age of Firm -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log of Sales 0.001 0.003 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log of Total Employment 0.004 0.003 0.004
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.072*** 0.060*** 0.068***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Pre-Transition Levels YES YES YES
Fixed Eﬀects (Industry-BG-Time) YES YES YES
R-squared 0.353 0.327 0.444
N 12989 10893 7710
Note: The table reports OLS regressions of the eﬀect of a dynastic transition on changes in wage raise
patterns. Changes in average wage raises are computed as the diﬀerence between the average, two-year
postsuccession wage raise minus the two-year average before transition. See appendix for the deﬁnition of
the remaining variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance
at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
28
Table 6: AVERAGE WAGE OF HIRED WORKFORCE
Dependent Variable: Changes in Average Wage of Hired Workforce
All Mgmt High Mgmt Middle Mgmt
(1) (2) (3)
Dynastic Transition -0.035* -0.042* -0.072***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Age of Firm 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log of Sales 0.054*** 0.042*** 0.038***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log of Total Employment -0.018* -0.019* 0.006
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 3.053*** 3.143*** 2.927***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.13)
Pre-Transition Levels YES YES YES
Fixed Eﬀects (Industry-BG-Time) YES YES YES
R-squared 0.470 0.438 0.445
N 4300 3357 1780
Note: The table reports OLS regressions of the eﬀect of a dynastic transition on changes in the average wages
of hired managers. Changes in average wages of hired managers are computed as the diﬀerence between the
average, two-year postsuccession wage minus the two-year average before transition.See appendix for the
deﬁnition of the remaining variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote
signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Figure 1: Diﬀerences in Diﬀerences
Note: The ﬁgure plots average layoﬀ rates (left hand side) and wage raises (right hand side) for the management
workforce of dynastic (black) and non-dynastic (red) ﬁrms for each year before and after the control transition.
All , High, Middle refers to management categories deﬁned on the basis of the Catégories Socioprofessionnelles
classiﬁcation used by INSEE.
34
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation
Working Paper Series
WP09/24 Bach,Laurent and Nicolas Serrano-Velarde, The Power of Dynastic Com-
mitment
WP09/23 Dischinger, Matthias and Nadine Riedel, There’s No Place Like Home:
The Profitability Gap between Headquarters and their Foreign Subsidiaries
WP09/22 Ulph, David, Avoidance Policies - A New Conceptual Framework
WP09/21 Ulph, Alistair and David Ulph, Optimal Climate Change Policies When
Governments Cannot Commit
WP09/20 Maffini, Giorgia and Socrates Mokkas, Profit-Shifting and Measured Pro-
ductivity of Multinational Firms
WP09/19 Devereux, Michael P., Taxing Risky Investment
WP09/18 Buettner, Thiess and Georg Wamser, Internal Debt and Multinationals’
Profit Shifting - Empirical Evidence from Firm-Level Panel Data
WP09/17 Arulampalam, Wiji, Devereux, Michael P. and Giorgia Maffini, The Direct
Incidence of Corporate Income Tax on Wages
WP09/16 Keuschnigg, Christian and Evelyn Ribi, Profit Taxation and Finance Con-
straints
WP09/15 Shaviro, Daniel N., Planning and Policy Issues raised by the Structure of
the U.S. International Tax Rules
WP09/14 Karkinsky, Tom and Nadine Riedel, Corporate Taxation and the Choice
of Patent Location within Multinational Firms
WP09/13 Koh, Hyun-Ju and Nadine Riedel, Assessing the Localization Pattern of
German Manufacturing & Service Industries - A Distance Based Approach
WP09/12 Loretz, Simon and Padraig J. Moore, Corporate Tax Competition between
Firms
WP09/11 Desai, Mihir A. and Dhammika Dharmapala, Dividend Taxes and Inter-
national Portfolio Choice
WP09/10 Devereux, Michael P. and Christian Keuschnigg, The Distorting Arm’s
Length Principle
WP09/09 de la Feria, Rita and Ben Lockwood, Opting for Opting-in? An Evaluation
of the Commission’s Proposals for Reforming VAT for Financial Services
WP09/08 Egger, Peter, Keuschnigg, Christian and Hannes Winner, Incorporation
and Taxation: Theory and Firm-level Evidence
WP09/07 Becker, Johannes and Clemens Fuest, Optimal Tax Policy when Firms
are Internationally Mobile
WP09/06 de la Feria, Rita, Place Where the Supply/Activity is Effectively Carried
Out as an Allocation Rule: VAT vs. Direct Taxation
WP09/05 Loomer, Geoffrey T., Tax Treaty Abuse: Is Canada responding effec-
tively?
WP09/04 Egger, Peter, Loretz, Simon, Pfaffermayr, Michael and Hannes Winner,
Corporate Taxation and Multinational Activity
WP09/03 Simpson, Helen, Investment abroad and adjustment at home: evidence
from UK multinational firms
WP09/02 Becker, Johannes and Clemens Fuest, EU Regional Policy and Tax Com-
petition
WP09/01 Altshuler, Rosanne and Harry Grubert, Formula Apportionment: Is it
better than the current system and are there better alternatives?
WP08/30 Davies, Ronald B. and Johannes Voget, Tax Competition in an Expanding
European Union
WP08/29 Pfaffermayr, Michael, Sto¨ckl, Matthias and Hannes Winner, Capital Struc-
ture, Corporate Taxation and Firm Age
WP08/28 Desai, Mihir A. and Dhammika Dharmapala, Taxes, Institutions and For-
eign Diversification Opportunities
WP08/27 Buettner, Thiess, Riedel, Nadine and Marco Runkel, Strategic Consoli-
dation under Formula Apportionment
WP08/26 Huizinga, Harry, Voget, Johannes and Wolf Wagner, International Taxa-
tion and Takeover Premiums in Cross-border M&As
WP08/25 Barrios, Salvador, Huizinga, Harry, Laeven, Luc and Gae¨tan Nicode`me,
International Taxation and Multinational Firm Location Decisions
WP08/24 Devereux, Michael P., Taxation of Outbound Direct Investment: Eco-
nomic Principles and Tax Policy Considerations
WP08/23 Fuest, Clemens, The European Commission´s Proposal for a Common
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base
WP08/22 de Mooij, Ruud A. and Sjef Ederveen, Corporate Tax Elasticities: A
Reader’s Guide to Empirical Findings
WP08/21 Loretz, Simon, Corporate taxation in the OECD in a wider context
